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Minimum Contacts in Contract Cases: A Forward-
Looking Reevaluation
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has de-
cided four cases addressing the extension of state court jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants.' All four cases denied jurisdiction and
marked a trend by the Supreme Court to limit state court
jurisdiction.2
In Shaffer v. Heitner,3 the Supreme Court required that a defend-
ant have "minimum contacts" with a state before that state could
exercise long-arm jurisdiction.4 In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 5 the Supreme Court said that these contacts must make liti-
gation in the state "foreseeable."' 6 These decisions, however, did not
address the issue of the contacts necessary to force a nonresident to
defend a suit on a contract in a foreign jurisdiction. 7 Much of the
discussion centers around whether the plaintiffs interest in litigating
1 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
The Supreme Court first recognized long-arm jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The extension of jurisdiction was prompted by two
Supreme Court decisions which followed International Shoe. In McGee v. International Life
Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court allowed California to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent insurance company based on a single insurance policy sold to a California resident. The
case marked a broad extension of state court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court limited the
extension a year later in Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), when it expressly stated
that territorial boundaries placed limits on the exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
remained silent for approximately twenty years before it reevaluated the standard for assert-
ing jurisdiction in the four recent cases.
2 See Louis, The Grasp of Long Am Jurisdiction Finaly Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407
(1980).
3 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4 Id. at 204. Long-arm jurisdiction is exercised over a defendant who is not present
within the state. Whether jurisdiction over persons who are only transiently present within
the state may still be exercised without minimum contacts is still undecided. See Ripple &
Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reftectioas on the RoadAhead, 56 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 65, 75-77 (1980).
5 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
6 Id. at 297.
7 Justice White noted, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in two cases, the diversity
of holdings in lower courts involving commercial contracts. See Chelsea House Publishers v.
Nicholstone Book Bindery, 102 S. Ct. 1623 (1982)(White, J.; dissenting); Lakeside Bridge &
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980)(White, J., dissenting).
should be weighed in determining the necessary contacts.8 The
Supreme Court through Justice White has emphasized that fairness
to the defendant is the primary concern and that contacts are there-
fore required.9 Others argue that fairness can be ensured by other
tests and that contacts are only one way of creating jurisdiction.' 0
This note argues for a middle position. Contacts should be re-
quired, but the number of contacts should vary with each case, de-
pending on the plaintiffs interest in litigating in his forum and on
whether the defendant could foresee the plaintiff's interest when he
established contacts. Part I discusses the minimum contacts test and
its rationale as set forth in World- Wide Volkswagen, the commentators'
criticism of the World-Wide Volkswagen rationale, and a proposed
compromise." Part II seeks support for this compromise in the ac-
tual results of the minimum contacts test's application, in World- Wide
Volkswagen's discussion of foreseeability of suit, and in an analogy to
liability in substantive law.12 Part III analyzes the contract cases and
attempts to reconcile the various holdings by applying a test which
considers the defendant's contacts in relation to the foreseeable plain-
tiff's interest.' 3
I. The Minimum Contacts Test in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
A. Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction
A state court cannot exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant unless the defendant has contacts with the state
which make it fair and reasonable for the state to require the defend-
ant to litigate in its courts.' 4 Although the state may have a strong
interest in providing the plaintiff with relief and the plaintiff may be
inconvenienced by litigating in the defendant's forum, the court can-
8 See Comment, Constitutional Li'itations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHi. L. REV.
156 (1982)(hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial
Litigation When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Boston
Note); Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible Appli-
cation of Long-Arm Jurisdiction Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 345
(1980) (hereinafter cited as Northwestern Note).
9 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
10 For example, Justice Brennan argues that contacts are only one way of creating juris-
diction. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 See notes 14-41 infra and accompanying text.
12 See notes 42-79 in~fa and accompanying text.
13 See notes 81-103 infra and accompanying text.
14 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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not exercise jurisdiction absent some contact with the defendant.' 5
The Supreme Court authorized extension of jurisdiction beyond
state territorial boundaries when interstate business transactions
greatly increased. 16 The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
due process clause of the United States Constitution limits this exten-
sion.1 7 The due process clause serves two functions in limiting juris-
diction: 1) it protects the nonresident defendant from unfair
litigation; and 2) it promotes interstate federalism. 18
The fairness requirement is satisfied by finding sufficient con-
tacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' 9 Courts
focus primarily on the defendant's contacts but may consider both
the forum's and plaintiff's interest in trying the case in the forum's
courts.20 If the defendant's contacts should make him aware of the
potential forum and plaintiff interest, he should reasonably foresee
litigation in the forum. 21
Interstate federalism is also a legitimate concern and limits juris-
diction through the due process clause.22 Justice White has given two
reasons why federalism should limit jurisdiction: 1) the states' eco-
nomic interdependence; and 2) each state's sovereign power to try
cases in its own courts.23
According to Justice White, the commerce clause prevents states
from acting as separate economic entities. 24 Broad state court juris-
diction over nonresidents could threaten interstate commerce if busi-
nesses decided that they.should not carry on interstate commerce to
avoid the risk of expensive litigation.25
15 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
16 McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (discussing the reasons
for recognizing long-arm jurisdiction). The Supreme Court recognized long-arm jurisdiction
in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
17 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
18 Id. at 291-92. But see notes 33-37 infra and accompanying text.
19 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204. The contacts must make litigation in the forum
"reasonable" or "fair" to the defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
20 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See also notes 44-79 infia and accompany-
ing text.
21 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
22 Id. at 294.
23 Id. at 293.
24 Id.
25 See Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 695 F.2d
289, 294 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that hindering free flow of commerce is a factor in denying
jurisdiction). See also Braveman, Interstate Federalism and PersonalJurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 533, 550-53 (1982); Chicago Comment, supra note 8, at 173-80.
Early decisions mentioned interstate commerce as a limiting factor in jurisdictional anal-
ysis. See Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). See also
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A state's sovereign power to try cases arising under its own laws,
in its courts, also limits the jurisdiction of other states' courts.2 6 This
limitation flows from the territorial conception of state sovereignty
which is long established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.2 7 When
a state exercises jurisdiction over a defendant who has no minimum
contacts, it encroaches on the sovereignty of the defendant's state and
could cause friction among the states.28 Also, the ideal of sovereign
states' coexisting in a federal system would disappear if a state could
judge the rights and obligations of persons having no contacts with
that state.29
B. Crticisz of the World-Wide Volkswagen Approach
Commentators have criticised both the minimum contacts test
and Justice White's reasons for requiring minimum contacts. They
propose other tests which may also protect the defendant without
requiring contacts between the defendant and the forum.30 For ex-
ample, one commentator has suggested that the due process clause be
interpreted to prohibit only undue burdens on the defendant.3' In
this way, the defendant could be made to defend a suit in a jurisdic-
tion where he has no contacts, but where he will not be unreasonably
inconvenienced, as long as the forum has a very strong interest in
providing relief to the plaintiff.3 2
In addition, federalism may not be a legitimate limitation on
jurisdiction since the due process clause protects only the defendant's
liberty interest and does not necessarily limit sovereignty.3 3 Both of
Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction ofState Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV.
227, 234 (1967) (saying that the commerce clause and not the due process clause limits
jurisdiction).
26 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
27 Id. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
28 This friction occurs, for example, when one state applies jurisdictional standards to the
citizen of a second state simply because the second state would apply the same standard to
citizens of the first state. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2nd Cir. 1968)(An-
derson, dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 620,
313 A.2d 129, 131 (1973).
29 See Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1956).
30 McDougal,JudicialJurisdictior From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1 (1982); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and PersonalJurisdictio: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
31 Redish, supra note 30, at 1137-43.
32 McDougal, supra note 30, at 9-10. Professor McDougal cites Justice Brennan's dissent
in World-Wide Volkswagen as a possible application of this approach. See World-Wide Volk-
swagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that minimum contacts are only one
way to create jurisdiction).
33 Redish, supra note 30, at 1133.
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Justice White's reasons for using federalism to limit jurisdiction have
been criticized. First, the effects of extended jurisdiction on interstate
commerce are not clear and may be beyond the province of the
courts to determine.3 4 Second, a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant need not divest a sister state of sovereignty. A sovereign's
interest lies in enforcing its substantive laws-not in exercising exclu-
sive jurisdiction over its residents.3 5 Sovereignty is adequately pro-
tected by restricting the forum's choice of law. Restricting the
forum's jurisdiction is unnecessary.3 6 Also, the principle of comity,
recognized in international law, should promote interstate har-
mony.37 If all states' jurisdiction extended to equal limits, they
would be able to defer to each other without sacrificing their
sovereignty.
C. A Proposed Development of World-Wide Volkswagen
Even if the Supreme Court follows the commentators' lead and
decides that federalism should no longer limit jurisdiction, the de-
fendant will still have a liberty interest in where he is sued.38 This
liberty interest places territorial limitations on a state's jurisdiction
by requiring contacts with the state.39 If a state could exercise juris-
diction over a defendant simply because he would not be inconve-
34 Braveman, mpra note 25, at 550-53. Contra Chicago Comment, supra note 8, at 173-80.
35 Redish, supra note 30, at 1139-40.
36 According to Professor Redish, application of its substantive law is the state's interest
which should be protected by constitutional limitations. Redish, supra note 30, at 1139-40.
See also Hill, Choice of Law andJurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1981);
Ripple & Murphy, supra note 4, at 81-86; Note, Removing the Cloak ofPersonalJurisdictionfrom
Choice of Law Anaysis: Pendant Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51 FORDHAM L.
REV. 127, 155-58 (1982).
The U.S. Supreme Court may not be willing to oblige these commentators by placing
strict constitutional limitations on a state's choice of law. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981), the Court allowed a state to apply its own laws as long as the contacts
between the state and the litigation create state interests which make application of the state's
law neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Id. at 320. The test for applying state law is
much broader than the test for exercising personal jurisdiction. Id. at 320 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
37 Comity among sovereign states was the basis for refusing to enforce judgments of an-
other state in older Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
165, 174 (1850). Professor Redish says the courts relied on the principle of comity rather than
on the United States Constitution to limit jurisdiction. Redish, supra note 30, at 1123-24.
English courts and commentators have also discussed this question in relation to the
English counterpart to long-arm jurisdiction. See CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 89 & 643-44 (10th ed. 1979).
38 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. See also Redish, supra note 30, at 1125.
39 See Insurance Corp. ofIreland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 n.10
(1982) (saying that jurisdiction is limited by due process and not federalism and stating that
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nienced by litigating there, the plaintiff would have much greater
freedom in his choice of forum, at the expense of the defendant. In a
minimum contacts analysis, the plaintiff may have a choice of forum
but it is restricted to forums where the defendant has chosen to estab-
lish contacts. If no contacts were required, the defendant would be
less able to anticipate where he might be sued since the forum would
largely depend on the plaintiff's decision. 4°
Once the contacts requirement is accepted, courts must consider
what contacts are necessary to create jurisdiction. The test for deter-
mining the contacts necessary to create jurisdiction should consider
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in his forum as well as the
defendant's contacts with the forum. 41 The emphasis should still be
on the defendant's contacts but it should be on the quality and na-
ture of the contacts instead of simply on the quantity of contacts.
When the plaintiff has a strong interest in litigating in the forum, few
contacts should be necessary. When the plaintiff has a weak interest
in litigating in the forum, a greater number of contacts should be
required. Part II argues that courts have implicitly done this when
deciding the contacts necessary to create jurisdiction.
II. Application of the Minimum Contacts Test
A. The Accepted Test -
The Supreme Court's minimum contacts test in World-Wide
Volkswagen has lead courts and commentators to focus on the first
question in the minimum contacts analysis: whether the defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum to create jurisdiction.42 In con-
tract cases, for example, discussion centers around issues such as
whether the defendant was ever present in the forum, whether the
"our holding today does not alter the requirement that there be 'minimum contacts' between
the nonresident defendant and the forum state.").
Justice Powell expressed concern that the Court's holding would no longer require con-
tacts to create jurisdiction. Id. at 2110 (Powell, J., concurring). In the majority opinion,
Justice White assured Justice Powell that this is not the case. Id. at 2104 n. 10.
40 See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978)(denying jurisdiction
and mentioning as a factor that the plaintiff could arbitrarily subject the defendant to suit in
any state if the plaintiff's unilateral acts could create jurisdiction between the forum and the
defendant).
41 The Supreme Court left this approach open when it said that presence of the defend-
ant's property in a forum might be sufficient contact with the state to allow jurisdiction in a
case where the plaintiff could be unable to obtain relief in another forum. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (1977).
42 Chicago Comment, supra note 8, at 158-64; Boston Note, supra note 8, at 383-84. See
notes 44-47 inra and accompanying text.
[February 19831
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defendant was a seller or purchaser of goods, whether the defendant
was an active or passive purchaser, whether the defendant initiated
the negotiations, whether the terms of the contract were F.O.B., or
whether the contract applied the forum state's law.43 The minimum
contacts test postpones considering whether the plaintiff or defendant
would be unduly burdened by litigating in the other party's forum
and whether the state has an interest in enforcing its laws or provid-
ing relief for the plaintiff. These factors are weighed only after find-
ing the necessary minimum contacts.
The lower courts usually state that the minimum contacts test
involves a two step analysis: 1) does the defendant have the neces-
sary minimum contacts?; and 2) is the exercise of jurisdiction reason-
able?4 After finding the necessary minimum contacts, which create
jurisdiction, the court must weigh several factors to determine
whether exercising jurisdiction is reasonable.45 World- Wide Volks-
wagen provides several factors for determining whether jurisdiction is
reasonable and fair: 1) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute; 2) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief; 3) the interstate judicial system's interest in resolving conflicts;
and 4) the several states' interest in substantial social policies. 46
These interests alone, however, cannot create jurisdiction over the
defendant. The threshold determination is the defendant's contacts
and not the forum's or the plaintiffs interests. 47
B. The Implicit Approach
The problem with the accepted test, which courts have at-
tempted to apply, is that the minimum contacts concept has never
been a fixed concept which can be mechanically applied to each
case.48 The United States Supreme Court views fairness to the de-
43 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 4, at 79.
44 See, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968);
Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Wis. 1970), appeal dimissed, 402 U.S. 902
(1971). When the contact is a single act or otherwise insubstantial, the cause of action must
arise out of the contact. Intenational Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
45 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
46 Id. See also Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 1974)(weigh-
ing the state's interest in providing a forum for the plaintiff, inconvenience to the parties and
equity); Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d at 878-79 (weighing the quantity and quality
of contacts, the source of the wrong, the interest of the forum in providing relief to its resi-
dents and convenience to the parties).
47 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 332-33.
48 See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
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fendant as the crucial issue. 49 The Court has emphasized that the
quality and nature of the contacts-not their quantity-create juris-
diction.50 Following this thinking, courts should consider the plain-
tiff's interest in litigating in his own forum-when this interest is
foreseeable to the defendant at the time the defendant established his
contacts-in determining whether the necessary contacts exist. Im-
plicitly, the courts have done this. The results of the minimum con-
tacts test's application reveal that weighing the plaintiffs interest,
while making the initial determination, is fair and reasonable. Very
few contacts create jurisdiction when the interests of the forum and
the plaintiff are great, but numerous contacts are required when the
interests of the forum and plaintiff are weak. In effect, then, the
courts weigh the interests of the forum and the plaintiff when they
decide what contacts are necessary for jurisdiction. 51
1. The Forum's and the Plaintiffs Interests
The plaintiffs important interest in jurisdiction analysis is his
ability to obtain relief.52 When the defendant foresees that the plain-
tiff will face difficulty in enforcing his cause of action, the defendant
subjects himself to jurisdiction by establishing only a few contacts
with the plaintiff and the forum. However, when the plaintiff can
readily obtain relief in the defendant's forum, the defendant has little
reason to anticipate suit in the plaintiffs forum unless he has estab-
lished more substantial contacts. 53
The forum's interest in the litigation is in providing relief for the
plaintiff.54 This interest is usually expressed in a statute which gives
notice to the defendant that he will subject himself to jurisdiction by
establishing contacts with the forum. 55
49 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
50 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
51 See Paolino v. Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721, 725 (3rd Cir. 1981)("Due process,
after all, is a two way street.").
52 See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. at 223. Several state courts have given
weight to the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief and exercised jurisdiction based on few
contacts. See also Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d at 878-79; Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal.2d 893, 906, 458 P.2d 57, 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113,
123 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 443-44, 176
N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961).
53 See Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc., 528 P.2d 1248, 1253
(Kan. 1974).
54 See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. at 223.
55 In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court held that under Dela-
ware's long-arm statute accepting a directorship with a Delaware corporation was not a suffi-
cient contact with Delaware to allow jurisdiction over the directors in a stockholder's
[February 1983]
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The plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief or the forum's interest
in providing it does not, however, create jurisdiction absent mini-
mum contacts.5 6 The defendant must still establish contacts with the
plaintiff and his forum through purposeful activity. 57 A plaintiff who
would be inconvenienced by suing in the defendant's forum merely
puts the defendant on notice that he will more likely be sued in the
plaintiff's forum. Thus, the mere unilateral activity of the plaintiff
cannot subject the defendant to jurisdiction. 58
2. The Defendant's Contacts
The defendant creates jurisdiction by establishing few contacts
where the forum and plaintiff interests are great. The defendant also
creates jurisdiction where contacts are great but where the forum and
plaintiff interests are few. For example, when the plaintiff leaves his
domicile to sue a defendant in another jurisdiction, the defendant
must have substantial contacts with the forum. Likewise, where a
nonresident defendant has contacts with the forum but the cause of
action does not arise out of these contacts, courts require substantial
contacts.59 The plaintiff and forum interests in litigating in the fo-
rum are few. The plaintiff, who is usually forum shopping, can bring
the suit in another jurisdiction. Also, the state has little interest in
applying its laws or in providing a forum for its residents. 6° Thus, in
derivative action. The Court noted that Delaware had never enacted a statute allowing their
state courts to exercise jurisdiction in that situation and that the defendant had no reason to
anticipate suit in Delaware. Id. at 216.
In response to Shaffr, the Delaware legislature enacted a statute allowing its courts to
exercise jurisdiction when the only contact is accepting a directorship in a Delaware corpora-
tion. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (1982 Cum. Supp.). The Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the statute while distinguishing Shaffer. Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176
(Del. 1980) ("The defendants accepted their directorships with explicit statutory notice, via
§ 3114, that they could be haled into the Delaware Courts. . ."). See also In Re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-73 (D. Md. 1981) (agreeing with Armstrong
and distinguishing Shaffr).
56 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 332.
57 See Ku/ho, 436 U.S. at 93-94.
58 Id.
59 The Supreme Court recognized the possibility in International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 318. In
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952), the Supreme
Court allowed Ohio to exercise jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation that was doing
sufficiently substantial business in Ohio to subject it to jurisdiction in a cause of action unre-
lated to that business. See also Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d
439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
60 Some courts have refused jurisdiction when the defendant had few contacts and the
plaintiff had other forums in which to litigate. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong,
360 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1966)(court lacked jurisdiction over nonresident publisher when
the plaintiffs were also nonresidents); Washington Scientific Indus. v. Polan Indus., 302 F.
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these cases the due process clause requires the defendant to have sub-
stantial, rather than minimal contacts with the forum. 6'
Most courts do not find mechanically fixed "minimum con-
tacts" before weighing the interests of the plaintiff and the forum.
Instead, courts implicitly weigh the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in assessing the contacts. Once a court determines that the
defendant has some contacts, the quantity of the contacts required to
exercise jurisdiction depends on the plaintiffs and forum's interest in
litigating in the state.
C. Foreseeability of Suit and Plaintiff and Forum Interests
Development of dictum in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son 62 supports consideration of the plaintiff and forum interests in
determining the amount of contacts necessary for jurisdiction. The
Court stated that foreseeability of suit in the forum is critical for
long-arm jurisdiction. The Court further stated that the emphasis
must be on the defendant's contacts. 63 However, strong plaintiff in-
terests in the forum, known to the defendant when he established
contacts with the plaintiff, would make suit foreseeable. 64
According to World- Wide Volkswagen, the foreseeability required
for jurisdiction, however, is something more than the foreseeability of
possibly causing injury in a state.65 This would render a person lia-
ble to suit in almost any state where he caused some effect 66 and
make it difficult for potential defendants to structure their conduct to
reasonably avoid litigation in foreign jurisdictions. 67 The legal sys-
tem would consequently lose the degree of predictability necessary to
ensure "orderly administration of the laws."8
World- Wide Volkswagen requires that the defendant foresee being
haled into court69 and that he establish contacts withthe forum
through his own purposeful activity. When a person's conduct in-
Supp. 1354, 1359-60 (D. Minn. 1969)(state lacked jurisdiction over nonresident subcontractor
when contractor was also a nonresident); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d
222, 225-26, 347 P.2d 1, 4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1959)(state lacked jurisdiction over nonresident
manufacturer when accident ocurred elsewhere).
61 See note 59 infra.
62 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
63 Id at 297.
64 See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
65 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 297.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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vokes the benefits and protection of another state's laws, despite few
contacts, he can reasonably foresee suit there as long as the cause of
action arises from those contacts. 70 When a person purposefully es-
tablishes contacts with a plaintiff who will be heavily burdened by
litigating in the defendant's state, the defendant can also reasonably
foresee being haled into the plaintiff's state even when his contacts
are few.71 Thus, through the foreseeability concept, the Court allows
for consideration of plaintiff and forum interests in determining the
quantity of contacts necessary to exert jurisdiction.
D. Analogy to Substantive Law
A foreseeability test, which considers the plaintiff's interest, finds
support in the use of foreseeability to determine substantive liability.
Foreseeability in jurisdictional analysis is analogous to its use in sub-
stantive law.72 A person will not be held liable for damages which
were not foreseeable.73 Likewise, he will not be subject to suit in a
jurisdiction where his contacts do not make litigation foreseeable.74
In tort and contract, liability depends on the amount and likelihood
of injury.75 When the potential damage is great, the defendant can
more readily anticipate liability.
Jurisdiction also can depend on the amount of damage. A
plaintiff who cannot enforce a claim in the defendant's state without
hardship is, in a sense, damaged. 76 A defendant who has contacts
with the plaintiff can anticipate suit in the plaintiff's forum when this
hardship would make a suit in the defendant's state inequitable.
70 Id.
71 See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 caveat a (1971). The Re-
statement recognizes three situations where a state has jurisdiction over a nonresident regard-
ing causes of action arising out of his contacts with the state: 1) the effects in the state are
intentionally caused; 2) the effects are reasonably foreseeable; 3) the effects were neither inten-
tional nor foreseeable. The first situation allows jurisdiction just as if the defendant had been
present when he caused the effects. The second situation allows jurisdiction depending on a
variety of factors, including how closely the defendant is related to the state and how closely
the plaintiff is related to the state. When the plaintiff has little or no relation to the state then
the defendant's contacts must be correspondingly greater to allow jurisdiction. Another fac-
tor to consider is the amount of damage to persons and things the defendant could anticipate.
The third situation allows jurisdiction only if the defendant and the plaintiff have extensive
relations with the state. Id.
72 Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980
Sup. CT. REV. 77, 91-96.
73 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACrS § 14-5 (2d ed. 1977); PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971).
74 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
75 See note 73 infra.
76 See Brilmayer, supra note 72, at 110.
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Jurisdiction, like substantive liability, also depends on the plain-
tiff's acts as distinguished from his interest in obtaining relief. In sub-
stantive law, the plaintiffs contributory negligence or his failure to
mitigate damages can reduce and even eliminate the defendant's lia-
bility.77 In jurisdictional analysis, the plaintiff's "unilateral activ-
ity" 78 and his reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state79 can
reduce the foreseeability of suit.
The Supreme Court has not discussed the analogy between lia-
bility in substantive law and jurisdiction, but the analogy is implic-
itly contained in the basic concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the
power to enter a binding judgment; this power implies the defend-
ant's l'ability to be subject to suit. The Supreme Court's discussion of
foreseeability in World-1Wide Volkswagen at least leaves room to de-
velop this analogy and apply it to the commercial cases that Justice
White found so disoriented.
III. The Contract Cases
State legislatures enable their courts to exercise jurisdiction over
nonresidents through long-arm statutes. The forum state's long-arm
statute is an important factor in determining the state's interest in
exercising jurisdiction.80 When a legislature enacts a statute permit-
ting the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident, the nonresident
has a reason to foresee suit in that state. 81
Many state statutes allow courts to base jurisdiction over a de-
fendant on contacts which arise out of a contract with a resident
plaintiff.82 These statutes usually require more contacts than a con-
tractual obligation with the resident before jurisdiction is allowed.8 3
Courts must determine whether the statute applies to the defendant
and then whether exercising jurisdiction will deny the defendant due
77 Set CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, § 14-15; PROSSER, supra note 73, § 65.
78 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
79 See Brilmayer, supra note 72, at 110- 11.
80 See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. at 221.
81 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216.
82 See., e.g., 14 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); 4A KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60.308(b)(5) (1976); 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1980); 5 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2031(b)(4) (West. Supp. 1982-1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(5) (West 1977).
83 The statute usually requires services or goods to be performed in the state. See, e.g., 4A
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(5) (1976) ("Entering into an express or implied contract, by
mail or otherwise, with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this state."); 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(5) (1980) ("Entering into a contract
for services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state.").
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process of law.84 Many times either the statute itselfP5 or judicial in-
terpretation8 6 extends the statute to the full limits possible under the
Constitution.
Jurisdiction depends on some contact between the defendant
and the forum state. Thus the court must focus on the defendant's
acts. In contract cases, however, purchasers and sellers have different
"quality" of contacts.
Sellers promise to deliver goods or services which enter the
plaintiff's state. When the seller is physically present in the state dur-
ing the course of performance, his contacts are extensive and the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction is usually constitutional. 87 Even when the seller
performs outside the state and sends goods into the state, his contacts
are usually substantial enough for jurisdiction. 88 Courts usually al-
low jurisdiction in these cases because a nonresident seller purpose-
84 See, e.g., Peanut Corp. of Am. v. Hollywood Brands, Inc., 696 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir.
1982); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d at 377.
85 See 14 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("[a]ny basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States."); 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a) (6)
(1980) ("[a]ny basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United
States').
86 See Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1065 (4th Cir.
1982) (construing the North Carolina long-arm statute to extend to United States constitu-
tional limits).
87 See Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1981)(upholding jurisdiction over a wine
importer who traveled to forum state in order to promote his product); National Gas Appli-
ance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959)(allowing jurisdiction when defend-
ant's agents entered the state), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960).
88 See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969)(asserting
jurisdiction over a nonresident seller even though the buyer initiated the negotiations, as-
sumed the risk of shipment, and traveled to the defendant's state).
Other courts find that simply selling goods to the plaintiff will not create jurisdiction,
especially when the plaintiff himself has reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state. See
Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956)(denying jurisdiction over
nonresident seller when the plaintiff initiated the negotiations and assumed risk of loss in the
defendant's state).
When the plaintiff lacks a compelling reason for bringing suit in his own forum the
defendant may be required to have additional contacts. In Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta
Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1965), the court held that negotiating a contract with the plaintiff
through the mails and telephone and agreeing to apply the plaintiff's state's law were not
sufficient contacts alone. However, the additional contact of shipping the goods F.O.B. the
plaintiff's state would be sufficient. Id at 587-89.
The nonresident seller must foresee that his act will have consequences in a particular
state. For example, when a manufacturer sells to a distributor who in turn sells in a state
unknown to the manufacturer, the manufacturer may not be sued in that state. But when the
manufacturer sells directly to a plaintiff in the state, he may be sued. Compare Ajax Realty
Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1972) with John G.
Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
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fully avails himself of a state's laws by entering its markets.89
The quality of purchasers' contacts differs from nonresident sell-
ers' contacts. 90 The nonresident purchaser promises to send pay-
ments to the plaintiff. The courts' major concern is under what
circumstances does this contact, alone or in addition to other con-
tacts, create jurisdiction.
Early cases dealing with nonresident purchasers generally found
payment alone insufficient. 91 Other cases have distinguished pur-
chasers who had additional contacts. For example, purchasers who
enter the plaintiffs state to solicit the contract have more extensive
contacts and courts exercise jurisdiction more readily. 92 Besides mak-
ing payments or soliciting the contract, the purchaser may have
other contacts, such as assuming the risk of damage to the goods, or
supervising the performance by using the telephone and mails, or
agreeing to apply the forum's law to the contract.93 These additional
89 See Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d at 994; Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp.,
417 F.2d at 369.
90 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 4, at 79.
91 See McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906-07 (D. Minn.
197 1) (only contact was payment to resident manufacturer and was not sufficient for jurisdic-
tion); Guardian Packaging Corp. v. Kapak Indus., 316 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (D. Minn.
1970)(payment to resident manufacturer was only contact); Oswalt Indus. v. Gilmore, 297 F.
Supp. 307, 312-13 (D. Kan. 1969)(payment and one visit to plaintiff's state were not sufficient
contacts); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinental Meat Traders, 181 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa
1970) (purchaser not amenable to suit when only contacts were payment to resident plaintiff
and accepting goods in plaintiff's state); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v.
Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962)(only significant contact was payment
of money).
92 Two California cases found jurisdiction over a purchaser whose contacts included
sending agents into California to supervise the plaintiff's performance in addition to sending
payments into the forum. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engineers, 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.
1975); American Cont. Import Agency v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 2d 317, 30 Cal. Rptr.
654 (1963). See also Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 261-62, 107
A.2d 357, 367 (1954)(allowing jurisdiction when defendant continually entered plaintiff's
state to supervise, when contract applied Maryland law and when defendant accepted prod-
uct in forum in addition to making payments to forum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
But when the purchaser's only contacts are promising to pay and placing an order
through the telephone without entering the state, jurisdiction may be harder to support. See
Architectural Bldg. Components Corp. v. Comfort, 528 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1974).
93 See Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973)(making
visits to supervise and sending numerous documents and telephone calls created jurisdiction);
Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974) (purchaser accepting
goods had sufficient contacts); Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid Center, 259 Minn. 330,
335-36, 107 N.W.2d 381,385 (allowingjurisdiction when defendant purchaser accepted goods
in plaintiff's state, attended numerous meetings and where contract was prepared in forum),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961).
When the plaintiff has reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state, jurisdiction may be
more difficult to exercise. See Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.
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contacts make an exercise of jurisdiction more likely. However, the
presence or absence of a particular type of contact such as presence
in the forum, initiation of bargaining, or assumption of the risk of
damage to goods is not in itself decisive.94
Some plaintiffs attempt to sue nonresident purchasers whose
only contact is making payments. The courts consider this contact in
light of the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in the forum and the
forum state's interest in providing relief, in determining whether
making payment alone is sufficient to create jurisdiction. 95 A court's
decision usually hinges on the extent of these interests. The plaintiffs
interests are greater when he has extensively altered his position by
relying on the defendant's promise.96 Courts deny jurisdiction when
the plaintiff effectively controls his own actions and the contract does
not stipulate where the plaintiff must perform.97 Hence, courts do
1967) (denying jurisdiction when defendant's only contacts were acceptance of offer and ac-
ceptance of goods in plaintiff's state while payment was made to plaintiff's agent in defend-
ant's state).
94 See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 603-04
(7th Cir. 1979)(the acceptance of goods in plaintiff's state is not necessary), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 907 (1980); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977)(the
initiation of negotiations is not decisive); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d
374, 382 (6th Cir. 1968)(the presence of defendant during contract performance is not
necessary).
95 See, e.g., Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1069 (4th
Cir. 1982); Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 695 F.2d
289, 294 (7th Cir. 1982); Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309,
1313-14 (10th Cir. 1982); Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 1974).
96 Many times jurisdiction depends on what type of goods or services are provided. Per-
sonal services of an individual usually mark a greater plaintiff interest. In Zerbel v.
Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970), appeal dismidsed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971),
an accountant prepared financial statements in Wisconsin for a New York corporation. The
New York corporation carried on no business within Wisconsin and was never present but it
did know that the plaintiff would perform there. The court exercised jurisdiction over the
defendant even though the plaintiff had traveled extensively to the corporation's places of
business in New York.
Courts also exercise jurisdiction when the defendant agrees to accept custom made goods
manufactured specifically for the defendant. In Nicholstone Book Bindery v. Chelsea House
Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1623 (1982), the Tennessee
Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction when the resident plaintiff purchased expensive special-
ized materials for custom made goods. The court noted the state's interest in providing relief
for its residents and emphasized that the defendant knew the plaintiff would perform in the
state. Id at 564. The court distinguished cases where jurisdiction was denied because the
plaintiff's goods came from a readily available inventory and were not custom made. Id
97 In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit denied jurisdiction over the nonresident purchaser since the plaintiff promised goods,
not services, and since the plaintiff had a choice of where to manufacture the goods. The
court said the defendant was not amenable to suit in Wisconsin simply because the plaintiff
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not find jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to base it on his own
unilateral activity.98 The defendant can reasonably anticipate suit in
a state when he has reason to know that the plaintiff will perform
there.99
Two factors will weigh against exercising jurisdiction and re-
quire additional contacts. The first is the plaintiff's reciprocal con-
tacts with the defendant's state.1o In these cases, the plaintiff should
anticipate suit in the defendant's state and not in his own state, at
least when the defendant's contacts with the plaintiff's state are few.
The second factor is the plaintiff's ability to obtain relief in the de-
fendant's state. 10 1 When the defendant enters into a contract, he
should realize the burden the plaintiff will face if a cause of action
arises from the contract. If the plaintiff will face a heavy burden if
forced to litigate in the defendant's forum, then the defendant can
foresee a suit in the plaintiff's forum. 102 A slight burden on the plain-
tiff can reduce the defendant's foresight and increase the contacts
necessary to create jurisdiction. 03 Thus, when a nonresident defend-
ant promises to pay money to a plaintiff who is slightly burdened,
chose to manufacture there even though the defendant could anticipate that the plaintiff
would manufacture the goods in the forum. In a footnote, the court said it could not express
an opinion about a case where the contract required performance in a specific location. Id. at
603 n.13.
When the defendant knows where the plaintiff will perform, jurisdiction will be easier to
exercise. See Nicholstone Book Bindery, 621 S.W.2d at 564.
98 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co., 597 F.2d at 603. The principle that jurisdiction cannot be
based on the plaintiff's "unilateral activity" comes from the holding in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See also Nu-Way Sys., Inc. v. Belmont Mktg., 635 F.2d 617, 620 (7th
Cir. 1980).
99 In Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit found sufficient contacts when the nonresident defendant sent film
into the forum state. The contact with the forum was not simply the unilateral activity of the
plaintiff since the defendant could foresee the nexus between the forum and the litigation and
the forum's interest in providing relief for the plaintiff. Id. at 497.
100 See U-Anchor Advertising v. N.H. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977)(denying jurisdic-
tion where the plaintiff solicited the defendant in the defendant's state, where the contract
was signed in the defendant's forum and where the plaintiff performed a substantial part of
his obligation in the defendant's forum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
101 See Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richard of Rockford, Inc., 215 Kan. 849, 528 P.2d
1248 (1974) (where the plaintiff was equally capable of litigating in the defendant's forum,
promise to pay in plaintiff's forum was insufficient contact).
102 See Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1069 (4th Cir.
1982)(telephone negotiations and use of mails were sufficient contacts when plaintiff faced
greater burden in litigating in defendant's forum). See also Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179
N.W.2d at 879 (Wis. 1970).
103 Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 695 F.2d 289,
294 (7th Cir. 1982) (third party plaintiff failed to show suit in forum was more convenient
than suit in defendant's forum); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d at 498 n.27.
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courts will look for additional contacts between the defendant and
the forum such as initiating negotiations, assuming the risk of dam-
age, and entering the state to supervise performance.
IV. Conclusion
Jurisdiction over some defendants whose contacts arise from a
contractual obligation with a person within the forum is a reasonable
extension of long-arm jurisdiction. Long-arm jurisdiction is based on
the defendant's obligations to the plaintiff which arise from contacts
with the state. 10 4 These contacts, and resulting obligations, create
jurisdiction when the defendant can reasonably foresee litigating his
obligations in the plaintiffs state. 0 5 The quantity of contacts neces-
sary to create jurisdiction depends on the plaintiffs position. The
contacts increase as the plaintiffs ability to litigate in the defendant's
forum and the plaintiffs reciprocal contacts with the defendant in-
crease. Thus, when a defendant contracts for goods and services
which he knows the plaintiff will provide in a particular state, when
the plaintiff has few contacts with the defendant's state, and when
the plaintiff will be more inconvenienced by litigating in the defend-
ant's state-the defendant should foresee suit. The fairness man-
dated by due process requires additional contacts when the plaintiffs
ability to litigate in the defendant's forum and when his contacts
with the defendant increase.Any disarray in the lower courts106 does not result from conflict-
ing jurisdictional standards. The disarray results from a poorly de-
fined method of jurisdictional analysis. Once the law recognizes that
the defendant's interest in due process and the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining relief both determine the contacts necessary for jurisdic-
tion, fixed rules will not be necessary. Two defendants, each with the
same amount of contacts, may be treated differently depending on
what plaintiff the defendant has dealt with. The question is not sim-
ply what contacts create jurisdiction, but also whether the defendant
can reasonably foresee litigation when he chooses to deal with partic-
ular persons. The Supreme Court's role in this regard is not to
promulgate fixed rules. Instead, it should develop a fair method of
jurisdictional analysis.
Matthew Schultz
104 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
105 World-Wide Vol&wagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
106 See note 7 sup ra.
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